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Recent neuroimaging work has demonstrated that the hippocampus is engaged when
imagining the future, in some cases more than when remembering the past. It is possi-
ble that this hippocampal activation reﬂects recombining details into coherent scenarios
and/or the encoding of these scenarios into memory for later use. However, inconsistent
ﬁndings have emerged from recent studies of future simulation in patients with memory
loss and hippocampal damage. Thus, it remains an open question as to whether the hip-
pocampus is necessary for future simulation. In this review, we consider the ﬁndings from
patient studies and the neuroimaging literature with respect to a new framework that high-
lights three component processes of simulation: accessing episodic details, recombining
details, and encoding simulations. We attempt to reconcile these discrepancies between
neuroimaging and patient studies by suggesting that different component processes of
future simulation may be differentially affected by hippocampal damage.
Keywords: hippocampus, future, imagination, simulation, episodic, autobiographical
INTRODUCTION
In daily life,particularly during theunoccupiedmoments,we often
revert to our inner mental world and engage with our aspects of
our lives outside of the present. Mentally projecting ourselves back
into the past or forward into the future can take make forms – a
cursory thought,a vague image,or a vivid and consuming scenario.
There has been increasing interest in understanding the ways in
which remembering and future thinking are similar or different,
both in terms of cognitive and neural processes, and whether such
characteristics are evident for various forms of past and future
thinking (for recent reviews, see Schacter et al., 2008; Szpunar,
2010). These studies have been informed by a closely related line
of neuroimaging research showing thatwhenpeople are consumed
by various forms of thoughts and images, these internally directed
cognitive activities are accompanied by a characteristic pattern of
neural activity – known as the default network (Buckner et al.,
2008; Spreng et al., 2009).
This network, which includes many regions traditionally asso-
ciatedwithmemory, such as the hippocampus, is also up-regulated
by tasks that speciﬁcally require a focus on remembering and imag-
ining personal experiences (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Schacter
et al., 2007; Spreng et al., 2009).Motivated by ﬁndings that remem-
bering and imagining engage the same “common core network,”
we advanced the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, which
holds that the common neural activity for past and future reﬂects
a reliance on memory to provide the details comprising both
remembered and imagined event representations (Schacter and
Addis, 2007). In that theory, as well as in this review, we focus
on a particularly vivid form of future thinking: the imaginative
construction or simulation of scenarios that might occur in one’s
future. We hypothesized that the ﬂexible use of episodic details
from memory during imaginative simulations of the future can
help to understand constructive aspects of memory, such as its
susceptibility to distortion (see also Schacter et al., 2011b). Like
autobiographical memories of past experiences, these simulations
are considered “episodic” in nature because they represent the
self engaging in a speciﬁc event in a particular spatiotemporal
context. And although the emphasis here is primarily on simu-
lations located in the imagined future, because of the adaptive
value of such simulations for maximizing future success (Ingvar,
1985; Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007; Schacter and Addis,
2007; Szpunar, 2010), simulations can also focus on present or past
events; indeed, we have argued that many of the same processes
discussed here are likely also applicable under those conditions
(Addis et al., 2009a).
Oneof themore compelling and evenunexpectedﬁndings from
research on the neural underpinnings of episodic simulations is
that the hippocampus, a region traditionally thought of as a“mem-
ory region,” can be engaged to a greater degree when imagining
than remembering (e.g.,Addis et al., 2007b; for reviews, see Schac-
ter and Addis, 2009; Buckner, 2010). Such ﬁndings raise the ques-
tion of what is unique about episodic simulation or future thinking
that recruits the hippocampus. In very general terms, it would
appear that more intensive processing is required when imagining
future events relative to retrieving past events, because the former
requires construction of a novel event, whereas the latter involves
retrieval of an already established event. However, determining
what speciﬁc component processes underlie this “more intensive
processing,” and which such processes rely on the hippocam-
pus, is necessary to better understand this future> past effect.
A number of candidate cognitive processes exist. Although both
remembering and imagining typically involve the reactivation of
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memories and episodic details comprising these memories, only
imagining requires the additional step of recombining such details
into a new arrangement – the imagined scenario. It is plausible
that this recombination process would engage the hippocampus,
given its role in relational memory processes that link together
disparate bits of information (Eichenbaum, 2001). Also, if these
newly constructed scenarios are ever to be accessed in future, they
need to be encoded and stored in memory (Ingvar, 1985). In this
review, we will discuss the conditions under which a hippocampal
future> past effect emerges, and also consider recent work inves-
tigating whether hippocampal activation during future thinking
reﬂects access to episodic details, recombining these details to con-
struct speciﬁc scenarios, and/or the encoding of these scenarios
into memory.
A related line of enquiry is to determine not only whether the
hippocampus is active during future simulation but whether it
makes a critical and necessary contribution. While it has been
long established that a functioning hippocampus is necessary for
the retrieval of detailed autobiographical memories (for a review,
see Moscovitch et al., 2005), it is less clear whether this is the
case for future simulation (see Table 1 for a summary of patient
cases discussed herein). While some patients with hippocampal
damage and impaired episodic memory also exhibit difﬁculties
in imagining detailed and coherent future events (Hassabis et al.,
2007; Andelman et al., 2010; Race et al., 2011), other studies do
not report imagination deﬁcits in such patients. Spared simula-
tion abilities in the context of hippocampal damage and memory
loss have been reported in an adult developmental amnesic patient
(Maguire et al., 2010), a group of developmental amnesic school-
aged children (Cooper et al., 2011; see also, Hurley et al., 2011),
and a group of adult patients with bilateral hippocampal damage
(Squire et al., 2010).
Such ﬁndings imply that a fully intact hippocampus may not be
required for future simulation. However, the inconsistent results
yielded from these studies raise a number of important questions.
Does the temporal extent of amnesia inﬂuence the degree to which
imagined scenarios can be constructed? Does the age of onset of
hippocampal damage affect the degree of impairment? Does the
location of the damage within the hippocampus inﬂuence the pat-
tern of spared and impaired abilities? Can residual hippocampal
tissue support future simulation? Are particular simulation tasks
better able to detect deﬁcits? In considering the ﬁndings from
patient studies in conjunctionwith those fromneuroimaging liter-
ature, we will attempt to reconcile these discrepant results by sug-
gesting that different component processes of future simulation
may be differentially affected by hippocampal damage: although
theprocesses of accessing and recombiningdetails to construct and
encode a future event are inherently related processes in healthy
individuals, it is possible that in the damaged brain these processes
are, to some extent, dissociable.
ACCESS TO MEMORY DETAILS: THE EPISODIC FODDER FOR
FUTURE SIMULATIONS
In recent years, neuroimaging has provided evidence to suggest
that imagining the future relies on much of the same neural
machinery as remembering the past. One hypothesis that such
ﬁndings motivate is that memories must be reactivated in order
to extract the information needed to “ﬂesh out” detailed simula-
tions. Indeed, if simulations involve the projection of the self in
time beyond the present (Buckner and Carroll, 2007) and are to be
meaningful for that individual, then personally relevant episodic
details from memory are needed. Such elements include the major
components of an episode, including people, places, and objects
previously encountered by the individual. In their scene construc-
tion hypothesis, Hassabis and Maguire (2007) argue that spatial
information is particularly important. A spatial framework pro-
vides a platform upon which to build the scenario, and without
this, an imagined event would likely lack a sense of coherence.
Although common hippocampal activity for past and future
events is suggestive of access to mnemonic information during
both tasks, it is not conclusive. Addis and Schacter (2008) exam-
ined whether hippocampal responses during remembering and
imagining were modulated by subjective ratings of the detail
comprising these events. Activity in the posterior hippocampus
correlated with detail ratings for both past and future events, con-
sistent with the idea that both tasks require access to episodic
details. Moreover,Weiler et al. (2010b) found activity in the poste-
rior hippocampus was associated with both past and future events,
though the responses had differing timecourses. Nevertheless, the
location of this neural response dovetails with studies implicating
the posterior hippocampus in retrieval as opposed to encoding
(Lepage et al., 1998; Schacter andWagner,1999; Prince et al., 2005),
in the reinstatement of previous conditions (Preston et al., 2004;
Giovanello et al., 2009), and in the amount of detail comprising
autobiographical memories (Addis et al., 2004b).
However, the most convincing evidence that access to episodic
details may be necessary for future simulations comes from stud-
ies of patients with memory loss (see Table 1). One of the early
observations of a link between past and future thinking came
from Tulving (1985). In a discussion of K.C., a patient with
dense autobiographical amnesia resulting from a head injury, it
was also noted that K.C. exhibited difﬁculties in imagining spe-
ciﬁc episodes in his personal future. Similarly, amnesic patient
D.B., who sustained brain damage as a result of cardiac arrest and
anoxia, cannot remember or imagine personal events (Klein et al.,
2002). In both cases, the neuroanatomical damage is not restricted
to the hippocampus (patient K.C. has damage in and beyond the
hippocampus, including extensive prefrontal damage,Rosenbaum
et al., 2005; no neuroanatomical ﬁndings have been reported for
patient D.B.). Nevertheless, these reports raised the possibility that
there is a link between remembering and imagining – that being
able to access details from episodic memory may be an important
and perhaps necessary condition of the successful construction of
episodic simulations.
Similar results have been reported in patients with damage
reported to be limited to the hippocampus. Hassabis et al. (2007)
found that four out of ﬁve patients with hippocampal amnesia
could not construct imaginary scenarios of everyday scenes: their
constructions contained signiﬁcantly less content that those of
controls, and the details that were generated were not well inte-
grated. Although the authors also found that providing patients
with details did not improve their performance, the provided
information was semantic in nature and therefore may not have
been sufﬁcient to support imaginings that have an episodic basis.
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One critical issue is whether these patients have damage circum-
scribed to the hippocampus. Although Maguire and Hassabis
(2011) state these patients were“speciﬁcally selected” for damaged
restricted to the hippocampus, Squire et al. (2011) disagree with
this assessment. They argue that aspects of the clinical proﬁles
of these patients (e.g., generalized atrophy, seizures, personality
change) suggest the presence of damage outside of the hippocam-
pus. They also note that the one patient in the Hassabis et al.
(2007) study who did not exhibit imagination deﬁcits had a dif-
ferent etiology (meningoencephalitis and recurrent meningitis, vs.
limbic encephalitis in the four other patients), as well as residual
hippocampal tissue and function (Hassabis et al., 2007).
Race et al. (2011) examined the ability to remember and imag-
ine in a group of eight amnesic patients with medial temporal
damage. This study is important for two reasons. First, the para-
digm included a condition in which participants were required to
construct narratives when the details did not have to be retrieved
from memory but were presented as pictures (also see Gaesser
et al., 2011). When completing the past and future tasks, amnesic
patients generated signiﬁcantly fewer episodic details than did
controls, and the number of episodic details for past and future
narratives was correlated. Critically, hippocampal damage did not
disrupt the ability to construct a narrative in the picture condition,
where access to episodic memory was not required. Moreover,
performance on the picture narrative task was not correlated
with performance on the future task. Second, although the eti-
ology and extent of damage varied across the eight patients, there
was one patient in whom damage was conﬁrmed as being lim-
ited to the hippocampus. Importantly, the performance of this
patient mirrored that of the other patients who had some degree
of extra-hippocampal temporal damage, suggesting that damage
to the hippocampus alone is sufﬁcient to disrupt future simula-
tion. Together, the observations from this study further support
the notion that in the context of hippocampal damage, it is an
inability to access details in episodic memory, and not more gen-
eral deﬁcits in narrative ability, that underlies deﬁcient episodic
simulation performance.
While studies of amnesia give insight into the ability to sim-
ulate when there is little, or no, access to episodic details, studies
of aging – where deﬁcits in accessing past events are present but
comparatively milder – have also provided relevant evidence. In a
series of studies, we have examined the ability to remember and
imagine in healthy and also in pathological aging (i.e., patients in
the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease), in which autobiographical
memory is typically affected (Levine et al., 2002), andhippocampal
atrophy and dysfunction are also evident (Hedden and Gabrieli,
2004). In these studies, we had participants generate memories
of past events and simulations of future events in response to
word cues and found that the number of episodic details com-
prising events in older or demented adults was reduced relative
to appropriate control groups (for a review, see Schacter et al.,
2011a). Moreover, the number of episodic details for past events is
strongly correlated with the number of details comprising future
events. These correlations are consistently evident across old and
young (Addis et al., 2008, 2010), and across demented and healthy
older adults (Addis et al., 2009b), and exist even when control-
ling other factors that may more generally inﬂuence the detail
of narratives, such as cognitive decline and verbal ﬂuency (Addis
et al., 2009b). The deﬁcits in episodic remembering and imagining
thatwe have documented in older adults do also extend to a picture
description task that does not require episodic memory (Gaesser
et al., 2011). Nonetheless, we also found that the age deﬁcits in
remembering and imagining were still observed after controlling
for general narrative abilities, as measured by this picture descrip-
tion task. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that the reduction in
episodic detail when older adults describe past and future events
may be related to dysfunction in the regions supporting episodic
detail, including the hippocampus (Addis et al., 2011b).
What is to be made, then, of patients with memory loss who
can still imagine the future? Such ﬁndings appear to speak against
the idea that access to memories is a critical precursor to future
simulation. Squire et al. (2010) reported that a group of patients
with damage to the hippocampus showed an intact ability to create
detailed imaginary future events.However, although these patients
have hippocampal damage, it is notable that their degree of retro-
grade amnesia is minimal: these patients can retrieve events from
the remote past, and only exhibit a mild (and non-signiﬁcant)
deﬁcit for retrieving memories from the recent past. Thus, the
results of this study could also be interpreted as supporting the
notion that access to the past – even in the context of hippocampal
damage – can provide a basis for imagining the future.
However, there are reported cases of hippocampal damage that
has differentially affected remembering but not imagining. For
instance, Maguire and colleagues reported that developmentally
amnesic patients who sustained hippocampal damage early in life
can construct imaginary scenarios (Maguire et al., 2010; Hurley
et al., 2011; but see, Kwan et al., 2010). Moreover, as noted earlier,
one of the patients from the Hassabis et al. (2007) study could
also complete their scene construction task. Interestingly, some
of these patients have been noted to have residual hippocampal
tissue that appears to be functional, in that it is activated during
memory tasks (Maguire et al., 2010), although such activation has
not yet been shown during future simulation. These researchers
also report normal imagination abilities in a group of children
with hippocampal damage and amnesia (Cooper et al., 2011), fur-
ther suggesting that the time of onset of the amnesia may be an
important consideration. It is possible that with early damage,
these patients develop other strategies or rely either on residual
episodic memories or detailed semantic information to construct
scenarios (Cooper et al., 2011).
It is also notable that these ﬁndings have emerged using the
scene construction task. Hassabis et al. (2007) mention that this
task was designed to “increase the dependence of constructions
on generalized semantic memory representations.” On each trial,
a sentence cue (e.g., “Imagine you are lying on a white sandy
beach”) is provided to take participants into a generic scene; it
is very likely that this scene can then be ﬂeshed out with semantic
detail. Thus, it is possible that these patients are able to com-
plete this particular imagination task using detailed yet semantic
representations of how certain scenes or episodes unfold, rather
than extracting information from their own experiences. How-
ever, when the task requires creation of a speciﬁc and novel
episode, similar patients (e.g., with developmental amnesia) show
simulation deﬁcits – particularly in the amount of episodic detail
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generated (Kwan et al., 2010). Although amnesics may generate
fewer episodic details relative to controls, they sometimes show lit-
tle or no reduction in the number of semantic details comprising
their event narratives (Race et al., 2011). It has also been shown in
other studies that patients with episodic, but not semantic, mem-
ory deﬁcits can successfully complete future thinking tasks that are
based primarily on general knowledge (e.g., non-personal future
tasks; Klein et al., 2002).
When faced with reduced or no access to episodic memory,
it may be a natural compensation strategy to rely on semantic
information to aid in describing autobiographical events. Using
a scoring technique that speciﬁcally parses episodic from non-
episodic information (Levine et al., 2002), we have also found that
although older adults show a decline in the amount of episodic
detail comprising their past and future events, they show a cor-
responding increase in the amount of non-episodic, conceptual
information (Addis et al., 2008, 2010; note also that this pattern
extends to picture description; Gaesser et al., 2011). In line with
this ﬁnding, older adults also show an increase, relative to young,
in their recruitment of lateral temporal regions during autobio-
graphical tasks (Addis et al., 2011b); these regions are thought to
mediate semantic and conceptual autobiographical information
(Graham et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2004a).
Another key question is whether access to episodic details is suf-
ﬁcient for future simulation to occur. It is likely that this ability is
only a starting point; once episodic details are extracted, they still
have to be used in ameaningfulway,whichwehave argued requires
additional processes such as detail recombination (e.g., Addis and
Schacter, 2008; Schacter and Addis, 2009). Nonetheless, the ﬁnd-
ings discussed earlier of intact future simulation performance in
hippocampal amnesics with relatively preserved autobiographi-
cal memories (Squire et al., 2010) suggests that access to episodic
details may be sufﬁcient for future simulation. By contrast, Andel-
man et al. (2010) reported a case study of a patient, M.C., with a
bilateral hippocampal lesion and loss of autobiographicalmemory
restricted only to the past 3 years. Thus, at 27 years of age, she still
had approximately 20 years of episodic memories to draw upon
when completing a future simulation task. M.C. was, however,
unable to do so: when asked to describe her personal future, her
responses were vague and general, or she reported that she sim-
ply did not know. Because there was no quantitative assessment
of future simulation performance in this case, the results must be
interpreted cautiously. Still, they raise the possibility that while
access to episodic details may be necessary in order to construct
episodic simulations, it may not be sufﬁcient.
DETAIL RECOMBINATION: CONSTRUCTING A COHERENT
SCENARIO
As we have reviewed above, being able to access details from
episodic memory can be conceptualized as an initial stage in
the process of episodic simulation. Of course, having a jumble
of details is useless if they cannot be recombined and integrated
appropriately. We have argued that “detail recombination” is criti-
cal to imagining coherent scenarios – the kinds of simulations one
creates when thinking about experiences relevant in their daily
lives. Given the role of the hippocampus, particularly the anterior
hippocampus, in relational processing, we have argued that this
region is likely critical in the ability to form coherent scenarios
(e.g., Addis and Schacter, 2008; Schacter and Addis, 2009).
This proposal is based on an integration of ﬁndings from
various neuroimaging studies. An early meta-analysis of medial
temporal activity during memory tasks reported that the anterior
portion of the hippocampus appears to be particularly responsive
to tasks with relational demands (Schacter and Wagner, 1999);
subsequent work has further supported this anterior localization
of relational memory processes (e.g., Giovanello et al., 2004; Jack-
son and Schacter, 2004; Kirwan and Stark, 2004; Chua et al., 2007;
Staresina and Davachi, 2008, 2009). The role of this region within
the realm of relational memory may be further reﬁned, based on
ﬁndings from Preston et al., 2004; see also Heckers et al., 2004).
This work suggests that the anterior hippocampus may be par-
ticularly involved in the recombination of details extracted from
various memories. Using a transitive inference paradigm, partic-
ipants ﬁrst learned to associate one set of items (faces, A) with
another set of items (houses, B). They then learned to associate
those same houses (B) with a new set of items (novel faces, C).
During the scanning session, seeing items (A, B, or C) taken from
anyof thememories (A–B,B–C) resulted inposterior hippocampal
activity, further implicating the posterior hippocampus in retrieval
or reinstatement. However, seeing novel rearrangements of such
details (A–C) resulted in selective anterior hippocampal activ-
ity. This recombination process can be considered analogous to
future simulation, where we argue details extracted from different
memories that may have not been encountered together in reality,
are rearranged in imagination – and similarly, this recombination
process should also engage the anterior hippocampus.
More recently, Staresina and Davachi (2009) investigated hip-
pocampal responses to the process of integrating details across
time and space. They identiﬁed a region in the anterior hip-
pocampus that was more responsive when details were presented
in a spatiotemporally discontiguous manner (i.e., separated across
time and space) and required integration, relative to when details
were presented in a contiguous, integrated form. Conceptually, we
suggest that this process again maps onto the kind of recombina-
tion thought to occur during simulation: an integration of details
from memories formed in different spatiotemporal contexts.
The ﬁndings of Preston et al. (2004) and Staresina and Davachi
(2009) dovetail with those from a neuroimaging study of past
and future detail. In that study, we (Addis and Schacter, 2008)
found common responses to detail of past and future events
in posterior hippocampus, but the anterior hippocampus was
responsive only to the amount of detail comprising future events –
which are presumably recombined across spatiotemporally dis-
tinct experiences. Interestingly, we have replicated the ﬁnding
of differential future activity within the anterior hippocampus
across a number of studies using autobiographical cuing (e.g.,
Addis et al., 2007b; adapted from Crovitz and Schiffman, 1974)
and experimental recombination paradigms (Addis et al., 2009a).
While the cueing task requires an individual to generate future
events from generic cues (nouns), the experimental recombina-
tion paradigm uses random rearrangements of episodic details
(persons, places, objects) taken from the individual’s own mem-
ories, thus ensuring that detail recombination occurs. Moreover,
these paradigms enable examination of activity during the initial
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construction of the future event when the cue is presented, and
the subsequent elaboration of the event once it is in mind. With
this approach, we have found that over the course of a simula-
tion trial, this differential hippocampal activity typically emerges
during the initial construction phase rather than being evident
throughout the duration of a simulation trial (Addis et al., 2007b,
2009a, 2011a; Martin et al., 2011). This temporal pattern sug-
gests that the differential future-related activity is associated with
processes occurring early in the construction of future events,
when detail recombination would be expected to occur. Other
labs have also reported similar future-related effects in the ante-
rior hippocampus. For instance, Weiler et al. (2010a) found that
imagining future events that had a low probability of occurring
during the upcoming holidays was associated with more ante-
rior hippocampal activity than events with a higher probability
of occurring. The authors suggested that perhaps low probability
events place a higher demand on the binding of disparate event
features relative to high probability events that may be already
planned.
Determining the boundary conditions of the future> past
effect will provide a better understanding of whether detail recom-
bination is important for engaging the anterior aspect of the
hippocampus. Importantly,we have recently shown that this effect
is limited to certain types of future events. We examined hip-
pocampal activity when imagining speciﬁc (unique) and general
(routine) future events, hypothesizing that constructing a speciﬁc
future event should place greater demand on recombining details
and hippocampal resources relative to constructing a generic
future event that more closely relies on conceptual knowledge
about routines (Addis et al., 2011a). Indeed, our analysis sup-
ported this hypothesis, demonstrating that hippocampal activity
was strongest when imagining speciﬁc future events relative to
more generic and routinized ones. Participant ratings conﬁrmed
that speciﬁc future events were more detailed and novel than
general future events, further suggesting that the process of con-
structing an event that is both detailed and novel engages the
anterior hippocampal region. Additionally, because these ﬁnd-
ings suggest that the hippocampus is not strongly engaged by
constructing generic future events, it may not be surprising that
patients with hippocampal damage can imagine the future in a
gist-like, conceptual manner.
These observations from neuroimaging studies suggest that
dysfunction in the hippocampus may result in deﬁcits in recom-
bining details. Several ﬁndings suggest the presence of such difﬁ-
culties. Hassabis et al. (2007) found that not only did the events
constructed by hippocampal amnesics lack content overall, but
the details they did generate were not well integrated and lacked a
spatial coherence. In healthy older adults who show some degree
of structural and functional dysfunction in the hippocampus
(Hedden and Gabrieli, 2004), we found that the integration of
memory details into simulations was reduced relative to young
adults (Addis et al., 2010). Using the experimental recombination
paradigm, we experimentally “extracted”person, place, and object
details from different past events; random recombinations of a
participant’s memory details were later presented during a future
simulation task. Importantly, each future simulation was required
to include the person, place, and object details presented. While
both groups were able to include all three details in the simu-
lations, the young group was better able to integrate these three
details into the same imagined spatiotemporal context. In con-
trast, older adults integrated on average two of the three details
into the same spatiotemporal context, and then often touched on
the third detail in a separate context, essentially resulting in a series
of“mini-events.”These ﬁndings suggest that evenwith experimen-
tal support to access details from various episodic memories, the
ability to integrate these details into a coherent scenariowith a spe-
ciﬁc temporal and spatial context may be reduced in populations
with compromised hippocampal function.
Again, one might raise the question that if the hippocampus
is necessary for detail recombination, how is it that some patients
with hippocampal damage can imagine seemingly coherent future
events? One issue is that not every study of future simulation
in patients includes a measure of detail integration or spatial
coherence and thus in instances where hippocampal patients can
successfully imagine, it can be difﬁcult to determine whether the
scenarios constructed were in fact coherent. Maguire and Hass-
abis (2011) argue that the number of spatial references produced
by the patients studied by Squire et al. (2010) appear reduced rel-
ative to the typical level of controls, suggesting that these patients
may have been creating primarily semantic representations. More-
over, it is possible to imagine a future event with minimal, if any,
detail recombination: one can “recast” past events into the future.
It is possible that paradigms using single cues may elicit recast-
ing. For instance, if shown the cue word “car,” one might recall
a relevant experience (“my car breaking down and my husband
picking me up”) and then imagine that experience unfolding in
the same way in future. In many protocols, it is ensured that partic-
ipants are generated novel scenarios (e.g.,Addis et al., 2007b, 2008;
Hassabis et al., 2007), but this is not always done or reported. In
order to circumvent this possibility, we designed an experimen-
tal recombination paradigm in which participants are required
to recombine details extracted from their own past events (Addis
et al., 2009a). Although this paradigm has been employed with
older adults (Addis et al., 2010), replicating our ﬁndings using the
cue word paradigm, it has not yet been used to assess recombina-
tion abilities in patients with circumscribed hippocampal damage.
The results of such a study would be of considerable interest.
MEMORY FOR THE FUTURE: ENCODING FUTURE
SIMULATIONS
Differential engagement of the anterior hippocampus may also
reﬂect the process of encoding newly imagined scenarios. Indeed,
the anterior portion of the hippocampus has been implicated in
encoding (Schacter andWagner, 1999; Spaniol et al., 2009), partic-
ularly for relational (e.g., Jackson and Schacter, 2004; Kirwan and
Stark, 2004; Chua et al., 2007; Staresina and Davachi, 2008, 2009)
and novel (Kohler et al., 2005) information. If the adaptive signif-
icance of simulating several alternative “behavioral modes” is to
maximize success in anticipated situations (Ingvar, 1985) and ﬂex-
ible planning (Boyer, 2008), then retaining this “ﬁtness-relevant”
information in memory for future reference is a necessary step.
Nairne et al. (2007) investigated whether information relevant to
survival is remembered better than survival-irrelevant informa-
tion. In that study,participants judgedwhether itemswere relevant
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to survival (having provisions and protection) or to non-survival
activities moving (moving to a foreign country) or judged the
items for pleasantness. In line with the idea that we are tuned
to remember ﬁtness-relevant information, subsequent memory
performance was boosted for items rated as survival-relevant.
Interestingly, more recent work using a variant of the paradigm
developed by Nairne and colleagues suggests that the much of the
beneﬁt of “survival processing”may be attributable to the engage-
ment of encoding processes that support planning for the future
(Klein et al., 2010).
Three kinds of evidence demonstrate the adaptive value of
simulations. First, it is well established that simulations play an
important role in psychological well-being. Being able to generate
speciﬁc anddetailed simulationsof future events can enhanceone’s
ability to cope with upcoming situations (Taylor and Schneider,
1989; Taylor et al., 1998; Brown et al., 2002). For instance, creating
simulations about positive future outcomes can improve emotion
regulation, resulting in decreased amounts of worry related to
upcoming future events (Brown et al., 2002). In addition to help-
ing one cope with the prospect of an upcoming event, mentally
simulating appropriate actions for future stressful situations can
enhance one’s ability to cope if and when those situations arise
(Taylor and Schneider, 1989).
Second, simulations are used when attempting to solve open-
ended or ill-deﬁned problems, where different possible solution
paths need to be mentally evaluated. Using the Means-Ends Prob-
lem Solving Test, Sheldon et al. (2011) examined the ability of
older adults and patients with temporal lobe epilepsy to solve
open-ended social problems. Both of these groups are known to
have some degree of impairment on tasks of autobiographical
memory (Levine et al., 2002; Addis et al., 2007a; St-Laurent et al.,
2009); older adults are also known to show reduced performance
on episodic simulation tasks (Addis et al., 2008). It was found that
when simulating solutions to ill-deﬁned problems, both groups
generated fewer relevant steps than controls. This ﬁnding suggests
that without full access to episodic memory and the ability to gen-
erate detailed simulations, the effectiveness of problem solving is
reduced (for relevant neuroimaging evidence, see Spreng et al.,
2010; Gerlach et al., 2011).
Third, recent studies have demonstrated that episodic simu-
lation has a signiﬁcant impact on temporal discounting of future
rewards: when people imagine experiencing a reward in the future,
they show an increased tendency to favor rewards that produce
greater long-term payoffs, thereby countering the normal ten-
dency to devalue delayed rewards (Peters and Büchel, 2010; Benoit
et al., 2011). Interestingly, fMRI data reveal that these effects
of episodic simulation on temporal discounting are associated
with increased coupling between activity in the hippocampus and
prefrontal regions involved in reward representation (Peters and
Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al., 2011). Related studies have shown
that varying the manner in which memory is queried can also
inﬂuence temporal discounting toward long-term payoffs when
memory queries emphasize the production of patient (vs. impa-
tient) thoughts (Weber et al., 2007). It would be interesting to
approach effects of episodic simulation on temporal discounting
from the theoretical perspective of query theory (Johnson et al.,
2007) and to determine whether the memory-based effects on
temporal discounting have a similar neural basis to those shown
for episodic simulation.
In order to inﬂuence future behaviors and realize these adap-
tive beneﬁts of simulation, it is important that simulations are
encoded and maintained in memory (Ingvar, 1985; Szpunar et al.,
in press). There is indirect evidence to support this idea. For
instance, individuals tend to act in a way that is consistent with or
constrained by how they have imagined themselves in those situ-
ations (Johnson and Sherman, 1990), implying that some record
of that simulation inﬂuences later behavior. There is typically a
high correspondence of stated intentions and subsequent behav-
ior (Fishbein andAjzen, 1980). Consider also prospectivememory,
where an intention is encoded into memory and later accessed and
implemented when triggered by a target event or time cue. It is
likely that the intentions involved in prospective memory range
in the degree to which they draw upon simulations. Particularly
relevant to the idea of episodic simulation is the process of form-
ing “implementation intentions” (Gollwitzer, 1999) which involve
imagining and rehearsing a plan with reference to the speciﬁc
future context in which it will be executed. Research has shown
that creating implementation intentions signiﬁcantly increases the
likelihood of carrying out that intention (Orbell et al., 1997; Chas-
teen et al., 2001), again suggesting that these simulations are not
only stored in memory but do inﬂuence future behavior. Pop-
penk et al. (2010) directly investigated the process of encoding
intentions, using fMRI to see whether later memory for inten-
tions was associated with hippocampal activity during encoding.
They found that successful encoding of intentions engaged the
hippocampus, as did the encoding of other forms of information,
such as present actions. But unique to the prospective task was
the recruitment of frontopolar cortex, consistent with ﬁnding that
damage to this region results in deﬁcits of prospective memory
(e.g., Burgess et al., 2000).
If the involvement of the hippocampus in future simulation
is only to encode imagined scenarios, then hippocampal damage
would not necessarily result in an inability to construct simu-
lations – just an inability to encode and retain them. There are
some data to suggest that this might be the case (see Table 1). For
instance, although children with hippocampal damage can imag-
ine scenarios, when asked to recall them the following day, they
do so with less accuracy and consistency than healthy controls
(Cooper et al., 2011). Additionally, adults with hippocampal dam-
age appear to repeat themselves more than controls when describ-
ing future events, possibly indicative of a failure to sufﬁciently
encode the scenario as it is constructed (Squire et al., 2010).
We conducted an fMRI study (Martin et al., 2011) to investigate
whether hippocampal activity during future simulation is indeed
related to successful encoding by incorporating the experimen-
tal recombination (Addis et al., 2009a) and subsequent memory
(e.g., Wagner et al., 1998) paradigms. During scanning, partic-
ipants were presented with random recombinations of person,
location, and object details taken from their own memories and
for each set of details, they imagined a novel future event involving
all three details. After scanning, participants completed an unex-
pected cued recall test, in which they were showed two details and
had to recall the third. By this design, we had an objective measure
of whether the critical details comprising each simulation were
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successfully encoded. As predicted, successfully encoded simula-
tions were associated with greater activity in the anterior right hip-
pocampus than simulations that were later-forgotten. Moreover,
the posterior right hippocampus was also modulated by encod-
ing success. A functional connectivity analysis revealed that both
the anterior and posterior hippocampus exhibited connectivity
with each other and a wider brain network (including medial pre-
frontal and medial parietal regions) during successful encoding.
When encodingwas not successful, the posterior hippocampus did
not show this pattern of connectivity. However, it is interesting to
note that during unsuccessful encoding, the anterior region still
exhibited connectivity with the wider core network. It is possible
that this neural pattern reﬂects the attempt to construct a simula-
tion, even if it is ultimately not encoded sufﬁciently to be recalled
later. We also found that the imagined events that were later-
remembered were on average more detailed that later-forgotten
ones, and activity in regions exhibiting an encoding effect was also
modulated by the level of detail. Together, these observations sug-
gest that constructing a memorable scenario may be related, at
least in part, to how well the composite details were retrieved from
memory and recombined.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS: MAPPING COMPONENT PROCESSES
TO HIPPOCAMPAL REGIONS
Considering together the patient and neuroimaging data reviewed
here, there appears to be evidence supporting the idea that there
are three important component processes involved in the simu-
lation of episodic future events. First, details stored in episodic
memory with which to furnish the simulation must be accessed.
Second, the details extracted from various memories need to be
recombined and integrated into a spatiotemporal context in order
imbue a simulation with a sense of coherence. Third, if a simu-
lation is to inﬂuence and guide future behaviors, it needs to be
successfully encoded into memory. The evidence reviewed herein
suggests that these different processes all rely, to some extent, on
the hippocampus. It remains an open and important question as to
whether different subregions of the hippocampus are speciﬁcally
associated with speciﬁc component processes. While the posterior
hippocampus likely supports the retrieval of previously experi-
enced details, particularly those spatial in nature, the anterior
hippocampus supports the recombination of extracted details into
a coherent scenario, and both regions support successful encoding.
This framework may be able to inform the debate on whether
hippocampal damage disrupts the ability to imagine the future
(Squire et al., 2010; Maguire and Hassabis, 2011). It is critical
that future research on patients with hippocampal damage employ
more reﬁned experimental designs to probe whether detail access,
detail recombination and/or encoding of simulations is disrupted.
The case study approachmaybeparticularly important here. There
is considerable variance of performance across patients with hip-
pocampal damage, and it will be important to understand the
speciﬁc patterns of spared and impaired sub-processes within each
case. Moreover, it is likely that the nature and location of damage
to the hippocampus is critical. Differential impairments of the
construction and/or encoding of future simulations may emerge
depending on the nature of the hippocampal damage: whether it is
conﬁned to the anterior and/or posterior aspects, affects primarily
the right hippocampus, affects the entirety of the structure, or
extends beyond its boundaries. Moreover, it will be critical in
future studies to ascertain whether damage in amnesic patients
is restricted to the hippocampus or extends more broadly.
Another challenge will be to ﬁnd ways in which to differ-
entiate the process of recombining details to construct a simu-
lation and the encoding of those simulations. These processes
are closely related in two ways: cognitively, with more detailed
simulations being more successfully encoded; and neurally, with
both processes engaging the anterior right hippocampus. As such,
they may be difﬁcult to disentangle. One fruitful avenue may
be to investigate whether detail recombination and successful
encoding are mediated by speciﬁc hippocampal subﬁelds. The
hippocampal formation is a circuit comprised of several anatomi-
cally distinct subregions, including the dentate gyrus, three cornu
ammonis (CA1/CA2/CA3) areas, and the subiculum. Recent work
suggests a functional distinction between the input structures
into the hippocampus (dentate gyrus/CA2/CA3) and the output
(subiculum/CA1). Speciﬁcally, while the input structures appear
to be involved in encoding, the output structures may be more
involved in binding (Carr et al., 2010). Moreover, the ﬁnding that
the dentate gyrus is involved in encoding is consistent with the
hypothesis that the ability to form temporal associations among
new experiences that happen close together in time is ultimately
dependent upon the continuous production of new-born granule
cells in the dentate gyrus (Aimone et al., 2006; Deng et al., 2010).
Extrapolating these ﬁndings to the realm of future simulation, it is
possible that detail recombination during future simulation may
be differentially associated with CA1/subiculum, and successful
encoding with dentate gyrus/CA2/CA3. Recent developments in
ultra-high-ﬁeld 7T MRI to obtain exceptionally high resolution
images of hippocampal subﬁeld anatomy – including distinct lay-
ers within subﬁelds (e.g., Kerchner et al., 2010) – will no doubt
facilitate more detailed investigations of the roles of different
hippocampal subﬁelds.
Neuroimaging studies to date suggest there may also be later-
alization effects in the hippocampal activity that is differentially
associated with future thinking. Speciﬁcally, we initially reported
that hippocampal activity common to past and future events was
evident in the left hippocampus, but that the future> past effect
was speciﬁc to the right hippocampus (Addis et al., 2007b). A
number of other studies ﬁnding future-related activity also report
a right lateralization (Weiler et al., 2010a,b; Addis et al., 2011a;
Martin et al., 2011), although some studies report such activity is
bilateral (Addis et al., 2009a). Interestingly, a patient with damage
that affected only the right hippocampus exhibited difﬁculties in
generating detailed future simulations (Race et al., 2011), suggest-
ing the right hippocampus may indeed be critical to this ability.
However, it remains to be determined what speciﬁc contribution
the right hippocampus might be making to future simulation.
The research considered here is in an early stage of develop-
ment. It is only during the past few years that studies examining
the contribution of the hippocampus to imagining the future
have begun in earnest, and it is clear that much remains to
be learned. Further integration of this new line of work with
more ﬁrmly established research on hippocampal contributions
to memory encoding and retrieval will be critical to advancing
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our understanding, as will integration with animal studies of such
related phenomena as prospective coding in the hippocampus
(e.g., Ferbinteanu and Shapiro, 2003; Foster and Wilson, 2006;
Johnson and Redish, 2007; for discussion, see Buckner, 2010).
We are hopeful that these kinds of studies will help to increase
our understanding of the neural and cognitive processes that link
memory and imagination, and in so doing, provide new insights
into how the future depends on the past.
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